Creating Citizens:

The Birth and Growth of the Cuban Internal Pro-Democracy Movement

 Xavier Utset

M.A. Candidate, International Development

Elliott School of International Relations

The George Washington University

Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle Atlantic Conference on

Latin American Studies (MACLAS), March 31^st, 2001.

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Retrospectively, however, the gathering represented one of the major diplomatic blows the regime suffered in the 1990s. The pivotal role of the opposition[i], which held parallel meetings with various Presidents, was largely responsible for such a result.

Earlier that year, an organized group of dissidents known as the “Group of 4” were brought to trial after spending fifteen months in prison. They were detained in late 1997 after presenting the document La Patria Es de Todos to the international media. Their trial in March 1999 triggered a surprisingly strong condemnation from such dissimilar international actors as Madeleine Albright, Nelson Mandela, the Italian Communist Party, and the Uruguayan leftist coalition Frente Amplio. The regime opted for swallowing such diplomatic embarrassment rather than loosening its internal grip.

These two examples symbolize the increasingly significant role that internal organizations of opposition have played in Cuban political reality since the early 1990s. Today, foreign policy assessments about the island rarely exclude the role of the opposition.[ii] Representatives of Western governments visiting Cuba typically include in their agenda conversations with opposition figures. Foreign correspondents on the island, in spite of the regime’s obvious discomfort,[iii] report profusely on the opposition’s activities. International human rights organizations inform extensively on violations on the island. In fact, such reports are frequently based on information provided by independent journalists and opponents themselves. More importantly, the Cuban government has evidenced a need to react to the opposition with severe tactics that endanger ongoing efforts to attract investment to the island. The passing of Law 88 in February 1999, which severely penalizes non-official news reporting, is probably the most glaring example .

Despite the evident growth of organized opposition to the regime, this movement has yet to become a direct threat to Castro’s hold of power. Any claim otherwise would be a misguided overstatement. Yet, the Cuban pro-democracy movement has managed to grow and consolidate in a bleak environment for independent activism. Currently, the Cuban regime lacks the power to uproot the opposition movement; in essence, the regime has no option but to “live with it.” This reality might be the opposition’s most important accomplishment.

This paper is an overview of the evolution of the opposition movement since its inception 25 years ago. First, the paper will reflect on a set of preliminary considerations that will help understand the context around which it revolves. The key concepts of dissidence, opposition, and regime type will be clarified. Then, the paper will outline chronologically the movement’s major turning points. As a means of conclusion, the paper will identify and evaluate the trends of the process exposed.

Some initial considerations

Before discussing opposition movements one must distinguish between the concepts of dissidence and opposition. Although commonly used interchangeably, the two terms hold different conceptual implications. While dissent arises within a group or political party, opposition comes from actors in the periphery of political control. Moreover, dissent “is not organized and does not seek to replace the existing regime: it merely seeks to criticize, to exhort, to persuade, and to be listened to.”[iv] Opposition, in turn, implies outright confrontation on essential matters. It requires organization and seeks to “displace the present incumbents.”[v] In other words, what dissent tries to reform, the opposition seeks to depose.

Dissidence in Communist regimes typically originates in the ranks of the intelligentsia.[vi] With time, as in Cuba in the mid-1970s, intellectual dissenters may evolve into outright opponents of the system. Usually, the catalysts for this transformation are frustration with official dogmatism, moral indignation, or the feeling of direct repression.

In Cuba, the anti-systemic movement started as an organized opposition group. Although some previous instances of individual dissent within the elites occurred,[vii] the objective of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights[viii] (CCPDH) was unambiguous from the onset. It sought a return to democratic politics and a sharp break with the status quo.[ix] The founders of the movement had diverged from the official Party line at some point in the past; all of them had suffered for it.[x] As a consequence, they sought to attack the essence of the regime, which they identified as the root of the “Cuban problem.” Through the years, as the movement grew in numbers, some individuals and organizations proposed changing the system from the inside, still hopeful that reform could occur within the system.[xi] During the height of Perestroika in the Soviet Union, reform was an appealing option for many in Cuba. Nevertheless, the regime responded unequivocally with repression. Dissent was not an option. Reforms, if any, could only come from the upper echelons of the Party. Consequently, although some organizations still advocate for reforms from the top-down,[xii] most non-official political organizations today in Cuba consider themselves in opposition to, rather than a dissent from, the Cuban Revolutionary government.[xiii]

Another matter of essential relevance is that of regime type. Many scholars classify the Revolution as a totalitarian system.[xiv] This version, however, fails to account for the complex evolutionary process of the regime. The Revolution has been moving, albeit reluctantly and against its will, into post-totalitarianism since the 1970s.[xv] This transformation is particularly evident in the 1990s. Simultaneously, the Maximum Leader continues to be the critical decision-maker, both in policy decisions and in the satisfaction of group interests. Therefore, the Cuban regime has evolved into a singular case of sultanistic post-totalitarianism.[xvi]

Post-totalitarianism is considered a residual by-product of a totalitarian system that simply stopped working. [xvii] The basic characteristics of post-totalitarianism are as follows: a ritualization of ideology and mobilization, limited openings of pluralism, social autonomy, and economic liberalization, and the empowerment of the bureaucratic structure in decision-making.[xviii] In Eastern Europe, most Communist regimes were post-totalitarian by the 1980s. In the Soviet Union, the death of Stalin marked the break with totalitarianism and the start of a new era of post-totalitarianism.[xix] In Cuba, the 1970 sugar harvest fiasco, the subsequent process of institutionalization, and the introduction of Soviet-style economic policies marked the beginning of a new post-totalitarian road to Communism.[xx] The changes in the linguistics of the Revolution are symbolic of this shift. Words such as planning, management, institution, and bureaucracy, replaced conciencia, sacrifice, heroism, and moral incentive.[xxi]

A second defining characteristic of the Cuban regime is its sultanistic nature.[xxii]According to Juan Linz, in a sultanistic regime loyalty to the ruler is based on “a mixture of fear and rewards to [the ruler’s] collaborators, and bureaucratic administration is constantly subverted by [his] personal arbitrary decisions.”[xxiii] Further, the leader is not constrained by ideological or legal arrangements, and appointments depend largely on his personal preferences. Often, the ruler places friends and relatives in key positions. In Cuba, personal charisma and political sagacity gained Fidel Castro the role as the Great Helmsman of the Revolution.[xxiv] Castro has further solidified his personal rulership through the use of fear and rewards. Policy-making, appointments, purges, and the fulfillment of personal interests all fall under Castro’s personal, arbitrary command. As Rafael Rojas put it “El itinerario providencial que conducirá la nave del país a su destino sólo puede ser patrimonio del líder.”[xxv] During the Special Period, Castro has used the influx of large amounts of hard currency to strengthen the sultanistic structure of power.

Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the erratic policies of the regime contributed to a deepening of post-totalitarianism. [xxvi] The demise of the Soviet bloc in 1991 contributed greatly to the decay of the regime. After the “Special Period in Times of Peace,”[xxvii] the Revolution has been “less driven by ideology, less capable of mobilizing the populace, and less in control of all aspects of Cuban life.”[xxviii] Popular support for the Revolution translates into ritualized accommodation to unpleasant but unchangeable realities. The population has mastered an entrenched system of social and political relations based on doble-moral,[xxix] and a nascent alternative civil society has struggled to emerge.[xxx]  Although the regime still possesses hegemonic control, it suffered from a critical crisis of legitimacy, as the ability to deliver equality and prosperity evaporates.[xxxi]

The process of post-totalitarian decay has left many spaces of autonomy relatively open for a burgeoning civil society. However, it would be imprudent to see these changes as a voluntary liberalization from the top-down. The budding civil society is primarily a consequence, although also a cause, of a crumbled totalitarian model.[xxxii] On the one hand, civil society emerges as the regime becomes unable to completely restrict it completely. On the other, the island experiences what Linz and Stepan call societal conquest,[xxxiii] whereby actors at the grassroots level create and enlarge cracks – or fisuras[xxxiv]- in the wall of the regime. The most apparent example of “grassroots liberalization” by societal conquest is the birth and growth of an indigenous movement of opposition to the regime.

The opposition to the Castro regime: first and second waves.

According to Enrique Pumar, Communist regimes generally face two waves of opposition.[xxxv] The first develops at the beginning of the take-over phase. At that point, the regime has not yet consolidated its total control of power. Opposition comes from former officials of the deposed regime, disaffected Revolutionaries, and genuine anti-communists. The first wave is usually doomed to failure because the forces against it are too powerful. The second wave emerges after total control begins to erode and post-totalitarian symptoms surface. The second wave is necessarily non-violent (as all weapons are controlled by the regime), and usually emerges from the ranks of the intelligentsia. Subsequently, popular sectors may also join to rally against the regime.

In Cuba, the first wave of opposition lasted approximately nine years (1959-1968). Most opposition activities were of a violent nature (i.e. the Escambray guerrillas, the bombing of the Le Coubre ship, clandestine urban movements),[xxxvi] even though significant attempts to redress the Revolution through civic efforts existed.[xxxvii] Neither method produced effective results. By the early 1960s Castro’s hold of power was too formidable to be uprooted. A totalitarian system was in the works and the bulk of potential opponents were either dead, in exile or in prison[xxxviii]. The second wave started in 1976 with the foundation of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH), the first organized opposition effort since the 60s. Democracy was the underlying objective of the second wave. No political tendency held sway over a majority of  the opposition, although social democracy seemed to be the most common political alignment. The purpose of the CCPDH was to advocate for respect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Later the agenda of opposition activities broadened to include a variety of political and social problems.

Following the initial period of resistance and uncertainty of the early 1960s, Castro created a structure of absolute power. In the first two decades, the Revolution faced only a few episodes of elite dissent. The most remarkable was that of the Microfaction Affair in 1968, in which 36 members of the Communist Party were tried and condemned for “counterrevolutionary activities and enemy propaganda.”[xxxix] Those involved in the Affair never formed an organized group; they merely met several times to discuss Castro’s cult of personality and the necessity of imitating the economic reforms of the Soviet Union, which Castro disliked.[xl] Most of the participants were searching for ways to perfeccionar the Revolution.[xli] They were, therefore, dissidents, not opposition.

The Microfaction Affair planted the seeds of the second wave of opposition. Ricardo Bofill was among those condemned. In 1976 Bofill founded the first opposition group, the Cuban Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH). Bofill received a sentence of 12 years of imprisonment for writing a critical manuscript seized during the Affair. His position was of ruptura rather than reforma. Many of those involved in the Affair, who were dissenters in the past, transformed into outright opposition after enduring the Cuban jails.[xlii] After the affair, they realized that neither Fidel Castro nor Communism were going to reform.[xliii]

The second wave of opposition can be divided in four phases: survival (1976-1988), growth and proliferation (1988-1990), coordination (1990-1996), and consolidation (1996-present). Each period builds onto the next. Alternative groups emerged and disappeared since the 70s, and there were attempts to form coalitions since the late 80s. These trends have not ceased in the present. Further, the opposition has experienced a curve of unremitting expansion since its inception. Even during periods of harsh repression (e.g. the months during Concilio Cubano in 1996) the opposition was able to pick up the pieces and regain its former strength.

From 1976 until 1979 only four members belonged to the CCPDH.[xliv] Dr. Marta Frayde, the co-founder of the Committee with Bofill, was arrested in 1976 and forced into exile three years later. By then, Bofill garnered international attention to her case and to several other human rights abuses. Little came of these actions, and the subsequent repression was unbearable.[xlv]

In 1980, the Mariel exodus brought some of the most gruesome cases of brutality to Cuba.[xlvi] At least 40 people were lynched as they attempted to leave the island, and hundreds suffered acts of repudiation.[xlvii] During the Mariel episode, Castro imprisoned all members of the Committee. Retrospectively, Castro’s action was key to the future development of the opposition. In prison, Bofill contacted the Arcos family, Elizardo Sánchez, and other political prisoners who joined the ranks of the Committee. Many of them later became leaders of the democratic movement. Members of the CCPDH first became organized and began to use their names and signatures in denunciations while in prison.[xlviii]

In 1987, eleven years after its first meeting, the Committee carried out its first protest. In October, the CCPDH offered a public mass in honor of the Polish catholic Father Popieluzsko, who was murdered by the Communist regime in Poland. Some weeks later, Radio Martí broadcasted the first public communication with dissidents on the island, called Coloquio en La Habana. The radio program presented various CCPDH leaders denouncing the human rights situation on the island.[xlix]

The creation of Radio Martí in 1985 was a turning point in the evolution of the movement. The US government-sponsored radio station allowed human rights activists to reach wide audiences within the island. Radio Martí was fundamental for popular recognition of the movement and for the recruitment of new activists.[l] The station “alleviated the official ostracism imposed on dissidents and established a two-way communications system,” channeling denunciations from, and news toward the island.[li] In the 1990s, Radio Martí was key to the rise of independent journalism, since it became the essential purveyor of independent Cuban newscasts.

From 1988 to 1990, the number of organizations and activists confronting the regime exploded exponentially, totaling approximately 100. Thanks to Radio Martí’s broadcasts, Cubans learned about the CCPDH and other groups of opposition.[lii] International human rights organizations were temporarily allowed to visit and produce reports on the situation in Cuba.[liii] In addition, the CCPDH decided to shift its activism from the mere transmittal of denunciations to civil disobedience. The Cuban Pro-Human Rights Party (PPDH), created in July[liv] to capitalize on the growing popular interest in the Committee, put in practice several projects of civic action, such as the collection of signatures to demand a referendum.[lv] In February 1988, the CCPDH organized an exposition of dissident art in Havana, with more than 200 invitees, primarily diplomats and foreign journalists, attending the opening of the event.[lvi] In reaction, the regime organized an acto de repudio at the house where the exposition was being held. Days later, Granma[lvii] published a series of articles condemning the CCPDH as “counterrevolutionary worms.”[lviii] Harassment towards Ricardo Bofill intensified and forced his exile in October.[lix] The opposition’s largest victory to date came a month before his departure, in September 1988, as the United Nations Commission for Human Rights visited the island and registered more than 2,400 cases of abuses. In February 1989, the Commission produced an appalling report based on these testimonies. This report was the first documented human rights-related embarrassment for the Cuban government in the international arena.

The Ochoa scandal of 1989 was the prelude of a severe wave of repression for the opposition.[lx] Between August 1989 and April 1990, the regime organized acts of repudiation[lxi] toward numerous opponents, beating and jailing others.[lxii] The situation was slipping out of control. The Eastern European regimes were crumbling, Gorbachev was unrelenting with his liberalizing policies in the USSR, the Ochoa case evidenced deep discontent within the Armed Forces, and the internal opposition was growing ever more complex. Fearing a descent into radical violence as seen in Timisoara and Tiananmen, several leading dissidents called for national dialogue and a referendum in Cuba.[lxiii] The calls were unheeded by the regime. Interestingly, the calls were also repudiated by the mainstream exile. In June 1990, several exile figures withdrew their support of the CCPDH after its secretary, Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, demanded national dialogue.[lxiv] This episode evidenced a severe disconnect between the internal opposition and the mainstream Exile, which fought for a hard-line stance toward Communist Cuba.[lxv] In later years, relations between the two experienced a radical transformation towards mutual respect and collaboration.[lxvi]

In the early 1990s, the opposition movement was growing in numbers and complexity. New organizations stepped to the front of the movement and new leaders emerged to substitute those who were in prison or exile. Notably, the movement generally exhibited a strong capacity to recreate itself regardless of the regime’s level of repression.[lxvii] Simultaneously, there was a considerable effort towards coalition-building. In 1991 two coalitions formed: the Coalición Democrática Cubana, and the Concertación Democrática Cubana.[lxviii] For some, no convincing reason existed for two coalitions.[lxix] Divisions were not polarizing: they were not based on antagonism but on political beliefs.[lxx] Yet the two alliances showed two sharp differences: the source of external support and the stance on dialogue with the government. The Coalición proposed a harder line towards the government and was backed in Miami by the Cuban American National Foundation. On the other hand, the Concertación continued to be receptive to the idea of dialogue and received direct support from Huber Matos’ Cuba Independeinte y Democrática (CID) and the Plataforma Democrática Cubana, led from Spain by the author Carlos Alberto Montaner.[lxxi] It is worth noting that two of the most influential organizations, the CCPDH and Oswaldo Payá’s Movimiento Cristiano Liberación (MCL), declined to affiliate with either coalition.

The work of the opposition in the Cuban provinces also began to thrive in the early 1990s. The CCPDH, the PPDH, and the MCL expanded into rural areas. Their delegations in the Villa Clara and Granma provinces were particularly active, as indicated by the increased repression suffered by their members.[lxxii] Similarly, in this period the opposition initiated a trend of “issue activism.” In 1991, the first independent workers’ union and the Independent Medical Doctors’ Guild were founded in Havana.[lxxiii] In 1989, the first association of independent journalists was created.[lxxiv] Similar groups surfaced soon after. This trend picked up after 1995, as the number of independent journalists increased exponentially and members of different social collectives, such as farmers, librarians, the blind, lawyers, and engineers, founded representative associations autonomous of government influence.[lxxv]

In March 1992, in the midst of an intense and relatively successful government campaign to discredit the Coalición and the Concertación,[lxxvi] the UN Human Rights Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur to observe the human rights situation in Cuba. A few months later his report strongly condemned the Revolution.[lxxvii] For the opposition, this censure was the “culmination of a work well done.”[lxxviii] The reprimand by the UN boosted the morale of the opposition and confirmed that their work was having a significant international effect.

The UN censure came at a time when an unprecedented number of government officials publicly entered the ranks of the dissidents and the opposition. Dozens of university professors, professionals, and military officers were expelled from their jobs for publicly advocating for reform.[lxxix] In the December 1992 elections to the National Assembly of Popular Power, 2.7 million voters cast null or blank ballots, an unprecedented situation in Cuba.[lxxx] Simultaneously, Cuba’s post-Soviet economic crisis was devastating. Food and energy shortages were commonplace. The population was growing desperate, and numerous acts of vandalism were reported.[lxxxi] The rate of balseros arriving to the US intensified significantly. [lxxxii] From 1992 until 1994 the regime endured its deepest economic and legitimacy crisis.

The climax of the Cuban crisis came in the summer of 1994. On July 13, government boats sunk a tugboat with 72 Cubans leaving the island, killing 42 people.[lxxxiii] Also, only in August and September 1994, more than 30,000 balseros were picked up at sea by the US Coast Guard.[lxxxiv] The spark that provoked such massive exodus occurred on August 5 as popular riots broke out in Havana’s malecón.  The revolt led the regime to open the border to those who wanted to leave by sea. On September 9, Cuba accorded a migration agreement with the US government, by which the US consented to help contain migration waves such as the 1994 rafters’ crisis.[lxxxv] As during the Mariel episode, Fidel Castro used the crisis as a safety valve to calm down the population’s suppressed anger.[lxxxvi]

Beginning in 1995 the government began to stabilize the economic crisis.[lxxxvii] Initial economic improvements did not translate into political liberalization. According to a report by Pax Christi Netherlands, in February 1996 there were between 2,500 and 5,000 political prisoners in Cuba.[lxxxviii] In the first three months of 1995, 340 detentions, 40 beatings, and 7 deaths with political connotations were registered.[lxxxix] President Castro himself publicly stated that “…no entiendo exactamente porqué el comercio libre y el hombre libre siempre han sido asociados. No creo que sean gemelos.”[xc]

From October 1995 to February 1996, a total of 140 opposition organizations agreed to hold a national meeting in Havana.[xci] The forum was named Concilio Cubano and organized by Leonel Morejón Almagro, a young black opposition lawyer. Concilio included organizations “ranging from human rights to workers and from ecologists to journalists and economists.”[xcii] Concilio’s declaration proposed the following four objectives: a peaceful transition to democracy, an unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners, a legal reform allowing the respect of human rights and economic independence, and an environment of non-exclusionary political participation.[xciii] Clearly, Concilio Cubano was the firmest challenge the opposition posed to the regime to date. With Concilio, the opposition finally joined together as one well-structured collective.[xciv] Therefore, the potential of the coalition was unpredictable. As early as January 1996, the secret police rounded up the leaders of Concilio and initiated a nationwide crackdown, thwarting the meeting before it actually took place. On February 24, Cuban MiGs downed two US civilian planes of the Exile organization Hermanos Al Rescate, shifting the focus of attention from the crackdown in the island to a renewed confrontation in the Florida strait. Morejón Almagro and another Concilio leader, Lázaro González Valdés, were sentenced to 18 months in prison. Dozens of participants suffered short-time arrests.

The experience of Concilio Cubano represented an exercise in democratic politics.[xcv] Although the final conference was suspended, numerous preparatory meetings took place in the preceding months. For the first time, a large number of organizations met and discussed the Cuban situation. However, the Concilio episode exposed a recurring division within the opposition between those that advocated for civic resistance (the ruptura position), and those seeking posiciones moderadas and dialogue with the regime (the reforma position).[xcvi] Lastly, the government’s response to Concilio ratified its clear stance of political immobilism. As evidenced by the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, Fidel Castro preferred to risk his international image rather than allowing the opposition to become a cemented block[xcvii]. Implicitly, the regime recognized that internal opposition had grown into a substantial threat that demanded intensive monitoring.

After Concilio Cubano, the opposition found itself confused and disgruntled. Many of its leaders were either in exile or in prison. However, these effects were temporary. Since 1997, the Cuban opposition has consolidated as a complex, multifaceted, sustainable reality in Cuba’s political life. A large part of the opposition intensified the use of civic resistance strategies.[xcviii] Even though the movement was still a “ghost” for a significant part of the population,[xcix] internationally it reached an important level of respect and recognition.[c]

In October 1997, the regime arrested a renowned group of dissident intellectuals known as the Grupo de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna (GTDI). The GTDI consisted of a university professor, an economist, a pilot, and a lawyer. Interestingly, the pilot was none other than Vladimiro Roca, the son of PCC-founder Blas Roca. They had presented the document La Patria Es de Todos to the international media. The document was a direct challenge to the principles charted at the recently held 4^th Congress of the PCC. Earlier, in late 1996, Elizardo Sánchez Santacruz, one of the most renowned Cuban dissidents outside Cuba, received the French Human Rights Award from the French President Jacques Chirac in Paris. After 1997, the different independent social groups blossomed throughout the 1990s were particularly active. The number of independent unions, agricultural cooperatives, libraries, and guilds grew rapidly.[ci] Most importantly, the government was never capable of impeding the expansion of the independent journalists’ network. In 1999 there were 20 independent press agencies with correspondents reporting from all 14 provinces.[cii] Independent journalists received numerous awards from international press associations,[ciii] and the amount of work produced exceeded the capacity of those who processed it outside of Cuba.[civ] Even after the passing of Law 88 in 1999, designed to severely restrict the flow of information from and to the island, independent journalists carried on their activities undeterred. 

In early 1998, Pope John Paul II visited the island. The “pilgrimage to Cuba sparked hope that the government would ease its repressive tactics.”[cv] However, the regime organized the visit as part of a well-planned strategy of international diplomacy, intended to portray Cuba as a country in a full-fledged transformation. The strategy was partly successful, as the regime eluded the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) condemnation for the first time in 6 years. Moreover the mandate of the UNHCR Special Rapporteur to Cuba was not extended, and Cuba was allowed into the Lomé economic treaty as an observing member. There was also serious talk of a visit by the Spanish King Juan Carlos I to the Island.[cvi]

Even though 1998 was one of the most stable years in recent memory, the government failed to heed the Pope’s call to “open Cuba to the world.”[cvii] According to the Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation  (CCDHRN), there were between 200 and 300 political prisoners in Cuba at that time.[cviii] Human Rights Watch placed the total closer to 400.[cix] The trials of opponents Reynaldo Alfaro and Cecilio Monteagudo, and independent journalist Mario J. Viera reminded the international community that the situation of civil liberties had not changed since the Pope’s visit. Similarly, Fidel Castro continued to disregard countless international appeals for the liberation of the GTDI activists jailed in 1997.[cx]

Only twelve months after the Pope’s visit, the regime altered its strategy to the more traditional, hard-line stance towards opposition and dissent. As noted above, the government passed Law 88 (also known as the Gag Law) in February 1999 as a reaction to increased activities by independent press agencies. It is worth noting that the law explicitly links “counterrevolutionary activities” of the independent press to the U.S. embargo. By establishing this connection, the government intended to disqualify autonomous news reporting as being anti-Cuban.

In March 1999, the GTDI dissidents arrested two years earlier were finally brought to trial under accusations of sedition. The trial and conviction of the four caused an international uproar.[cxi] The Group of 4, as they came to be known, became the most “emblematic figures of the Cuban opposition.”[cxii] The regime was determined to show strength and internal unity. The dissidents received sentences ranging between 3 ½ and 5 years.[cxiii]

The year of 1999 saw a momentous increase in opposition activism. According to the report Pasos a la Libertad 1999, there were 227 confirmed acts of civic resistance in the island. A year earlier there had been 100.[cxiv] A large part of these activities occurred in the context of two key events: the 40-day fast Ayuno Vida y Libertad, and the 10th Ibero-American Summit hosted in Havana.

The Ayuno was considered the most important success of the internal opposition in years. It was the largest, most complex and structured collective action organized by the movement since Concilio Cubano. For 40 straight days, opposition activists established Centros de Ayuno in countless cities around the island. An average of 217 Cubans visited a Casa de Ayuno every day.[cxv] Very importantly, a significant part of the visitors were not members of opposition organizations.[cxvi] The Ayuno showed the level of collaboration between opposition organizations. Initially, 4 organizations put together the activity. By the 40^th day, a myriad of organizations had joined and organized Casas de Ayuno spontaneously throughout the island.[cxvii] The regime responded by not responding. The strategy of the State Security was to infiltrate the activity and disrupt it from its core. In part, this strategy succeeded in raising disputes between participants.[cxviii]

The Ayuno propelled the figure of Dr. Oscar Elías Biscet, a young black medical doctor expelled from his job for his stance against abortion, to prominence. A declared follower of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., Dr. Biscet was a key organizer in the Ayuno. In 1997, Dr. Biscet founded the pro-life Lawton Foundation for Human Rights.[cxix] Dr. Biscet was arrested during the Ibero-American Summit in Havana. He was later accused of desecrating the national flag and condemned to three years in prison.[cxx]

The detention of Dr. Biscet was one of more than 300 arrests occurred between November 1999 and February 2000, in the context of the Ibero-American Summit in Havana.[cxxi] For the government, the Summit was a new opportunity to prove that Cuba was a “normal” country,[cxxii] whereas for the opposition it was an ideal occasion to display its capacity of action. Despite the numerous detentions, the opposition held a national meeting of Cuban NGOs in Havana, a national meeting of independent farmers in Las Tunas province, and a number of rallies and public demonstrations calling for the liberation of political prisoners.[cxxiii] Various Presidents met with opposition figures and demanded the Cuban government begin a genuine transition to democracy. International news reports paid more attention to the opposition than to the issues debated by the Presidents. The Diaspora was a key factor in this dynamic. Most activities planned by Miami organizations to support the internal opposition were cancelled, so as to center the focus of attention on the island.[cxxiv] Further, prominent Exile figures lobbied the Ibero-American governments during the months preceding the Summit.[cxxv] In retrospect, the Summit propelled the opposition to center stage.

In 2000, the dynamics of opposition were largely subordinated to the case of the balserito Elián González. Internationally, reports regarding Cuba focused on the Elián case, which eased the environment for a stepped up campaign of harassment and short-term arrests.[cxxvi] Although the opposition held divided opinions on the fate of the balserito, the case did not provoke significant disagreements within the movement. Despite the unfavorable environment of persecution, in 2000 the opposition increased the number of civic activities and acts of defiance.[cxxvii] The perseverant activities of independent journalists continued to be among the most worrisome for the regime, as evidenced by the detentions of journalists Víctor Rolando Arroyo, Angel Pablo Polanco, Orlando Gonález Bridón, and Jesús Hernández.[cxxviii]

Concluding remarks

As a means of conclusion, following are some observations on the most prominent issues regarding the opposition’s process of growth and consolidation:

Demographics of opposition: The opposition has notably changed its demographic composition since 1976. The movement initiated as a reaction by a handful Havana-based intellectuals to personal experiences of direct repression. After 1988, the movement evolved into a phenomenon involving thousands of citizens from all social strata, and from all 14 provinces in the island. Youth, women, and afro-cubans often gained leadership positions within the ranks of numerous organizations.[cxxix] Simultaneously, the range of activities diversified, including not only human rights denunciations but also the interests of social sectors such as farmers, journalists, workers, teachers, lawyers, professionals, and librarians. In the last three years, the level of democratic activism has been larger in the rural areas than in Havana, what ratifies the perception that the opposition is becoming a broader movement as time goes by.

The essence of the movement remains intact: After 25 years of activism, the movement remains loyal to its two essential characteristics: the realization of democracy as the foremost objective, and the use of peaceful methods for political change.

Relations with the exiled community: Until the early 1990s the relationship between Exile organizations and the internal opposition was nil.[cxxx] Entrenched within the hermetic game of Cold War politics, the Exile perceived internal dissidence to be merely a political maneuver of the Castro regime.[cxxxi] The arrival of the first exiled members of the opposition, such as Ricardo Bofill and Samuel Martínez Lara, and the end of the Cold War, allowed gradual engagement towards the internal opposition. Particularly after Concilio Cubano, the bulk of the Exile community professes support to the cause of the opposition. The epicenter of pro-democracy activism shifted from Miami to Havana. In this sense, the Cuban American National Foundation’s post-Elián strategy shift, which de-emphasizes lobbying activities for the U.S. embargo and underscores support for the opposition, is very telling.[cxxxii]

Dialogue with the regime: The dichotomy dialogue vs. confrontation has been an underlying theme of opposition (and Exile, for that matter) politics since the late 1980s. Since that time, opposition figures issued countless appeals to the government for tripartite dialogue between the regime, the opposition, and the Exile.[cxxxiii] The reaction of the regime has been consistent: either repression or silence. Among opponents the consensus is that Fidel Castro will never dialogue with internal dissidents, whatever their nature.[cxxxiv] Most organizations consider civic resistance and civil disobedience the only strategies that offer positive results.[cxxxv]  

Link with the general population: By nature, opposition movements in non-democracies tend to be marginal, significantly detached from the general population. The Cuban movement is not an exception. Rarely do opposition initiatives rally significant numbers of non-activist citizens.[cxxxvi] Fear, hopelessness, and the opposition’s lack of access to mass media are responsible for the lack of connection. In general, the population knows there is an opposition movement, but knows little about it.[cxxxvii] If they know about the opposition, they tend to forego them as naïve.[cxxxviii] Further, the prevalent attitude is one of alienation from politics. People tend to worry about their well-being –resolver. Self-censure is common; politics are a non-issue for many in Cuba. [cxxxix] If circumstances become untenable, many prefer to leave the island –“exit”– rather than stay and join the opposition – “voice”.[cxl] Fear stimulates this reaction. The regime continues to use physical and psychological terror as forms of social control.[cxli]

US Policy: The 1992 Cuba Democracy Act and the 1996 Cuba Liberty Act legislate US policy towards the Cuban internal opposition. In line with these Acts, the USAID Cuba Program has dispatched a total of approximately $10 million since its inception.[cxlii] US direct assistance to groups inside the island is prohibited. US support is channeled through NGOs, mainly Miami-based, who maintain direct contact with opposition groups. Comparatively, U.S. democracy assistance to Cuba is small.[cxliii] According to Juan López, the size of aid reflected the Clinton administration’s policy of maintaining the status quo in the island.[cxliv] A “deplorable policy” towards broadcasts to Cuba further evidences Clinton’s “stability-seeking” strategy.[cxlv] The Cuban regime continues to effectively jam Radio and TV Martí, mainly due to US indecision to augment the stations’ emission power. These circumstances severely limit the stations’ extraordinary potential for bringing about change.

The “exit” option:[cxlvi] As explained above, Cubans tend to opt for leaving the country when faced with the Hirschmanesque dilemma of “exit” or “voice”. Hopelessness, or the feeling that nobody can change the situation in Cuba, is dominant in the island. Desperation generally leads to escape or resignation; rarely to protest.[cxlvii] This dynamic fits perfectly into the regime’s strategy. Fidel Castro has repeatedly used the “exit” option as a safety valve to liberate internal pressures in moments of great tension.[cxlviii] In contrast to some of the former Communist countries in Eastern Europe, the Cuban regime favors the “exit” option over internal dissent.[cxlix] Paradoxically, current US migration policy towards Cuba plays into Castro’s interests while contradicting basic tenets of the embargo objectives.[cl] Simultaneously, there are some concerns that a percentage of members of the opposition participate in political activism as a way to justify applications for asylum at embassies as political refugees.[cli]

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